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SYMPOSIUM
THE PRESIDENCY AND CONGRESS:
CONSTITUTIONALLY SEPARATED AND
SHARED POWERS
The doctrine of separation of powers is a basic tenet ofAmerican jurispru-
dence. This Symposium probes into its ongoing vitality in shaping contempo-
rary legal and public policy issues. The following is a documentation of the
Federalist Society Conference entitled "The Presidency and Congress: Con-
stitutionally Separated and Shared Powers" held on January 19 and 20,
1990 at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C.
OPENING ADDRESS
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS:
AN EXEMPLAR OF THE RULE OF LAW
DICK THORNBURGH*
In the fall of 1989, I had the unique opportunity, as Attorney General
of the United States, to undertake an historic dialogue on the rule of law
and human rights with those leaders in the Soviet Union charged with
responsibility for law enforcement and the administration of justice. Our
week-long visit to Moscow, at the invitation of the Soviet Minister of
Justice, afforded us the chance to range over a wide variety of subjects
* Attorney General of the United States.
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central to what makes our democracy work: our Bill of Rights, our fed-
eral system, our two-party political process, and, most important, the
principle of separation of powers embodied in our Constitution.
It was, perhaps, this last-the concept of the separation of powers-
that most confounded our Soviet hosts. It seemed to be a distraction
from their apparently sincere effort to fashion what President Mikhail
Gorbachev has described as his ultimate aspiration, a law-based state.
To the Russian officials, judges, law professors, and students with whom
we exchanged views, the concept of purposely "building in" a construc-
tive tension between separate branches of government, i.e. our concept
of checks and balances, was, at the least, puzzling and, at most,
incomprehensible. I
Accustomed to their own monolithic system, they would surely have
to struggle to understand Justice Brandeis' observation that we adopted
the separation of powers in 1787 "not to avoid friction, but, by means of
the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of government powers
among the [branches], to save the people from autocracy."2
We in this nation, on the other hand, too often take for granted those
principles which are truly at the heart of our democratic process. So this
conference's focus on "The Presidency and Congress: Constitutionally
Separated and Shared Powers" serves the dual purpose of sharpening our
own focus on these principles and, at the same time, highlighting some
unique aspects of our system that might yet be emulated by the new de-
mocracies in Eastern Europe and, hopefully, in the Soviet Union itself.
Let me then offer a brief present-day lawyer's view on separation of pow-
ers here in the United States.
As lawyers, we have been educated and trained in the value of process.
As much as we may be committed to the idea of preserving individual
liberties, we know the only bulwark that will truly protect those precious
liberties is process. The rights and freedoms of all citizens are only as
secure as the system established to protect them is strong.
For instance, even the Soviet Union has a document that purports to
establish rights for its citizens, like our own Bill of Rights. The fact that
the document obviously has not done so, that the Soviets are turning to
us for legal advice on how to make any such guarantee of rights work,
1. R. Thornburgh, The Soviet Union and the Rule of Law, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 27 (spring
1990).
2. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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should tell us something. What I believe it tells us is that separation of
powers, just as Montesquieu, and Locke, and Madison argued, is the sur-
est protection for individual liberties, in a system of secured democracy.
However, today, I fear that system is a little less secure, a little less
strong than it once was and ought to be. The principle of separation of
powers is being threatened. The danger is not yet such that there is an
imminent risk either to our liberties or our security. We may not yet
have reached the point which Madison envisioned where "The Legisla-
tive Department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex,"3 but I do believe it is ap-
propriate to note that, if Congress' increasing tendency to encroach upon
the power of the executive branch continues, it ultimately could threaten
our liberties and our security. One must recall the prescient fear of legis-
lative usurpation of power expressed in The Federalist: "[i]t is against
the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to
indulge all of their jealousy and exhaust all their precaution."4 Further-
more, even if there are not as yet serious problems, Congress' increasing
tendency to interfere with executive power has, in itself, made it much
harder for the Executive to fulfill its responsibilities. Before providing
some examples of how and where I believe the Congress has encroached
on the President's constitutional power, I would like to make a couple of
general observations about my personal philosophy regarding the separa-
tion of powers.
I am not one who believes that there is no room for coordination and
consultation between the executive and legislative branches. Nor am I
one who believes that it is always clear where the lines of power should
be drawn between the two branches. In fact, I tend to believe that it may
be a good thing that we do not know precisely where those lines fall.
Because there is not always certainty as to how far the executive and
legislative branches may operate and still remain within their proper
spheres, there is a strong incentive for the branches to work together to
compromise their differences. Neither branch is enthusiastic about liti-
gating the scope of its powers when defeat, either way, can represent a
much greater loss of power than would any compromise.
Nevertheless, there is a strong tendency in each branch-"ambition
confronting ambition," as Madison proposed -to try to garner as much
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, 333 (J. Madison)(J. Cooke ed. 1961).
4. Id. at 333-34.
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, 349 (J. Madison)(J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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power for itself as the other branches will allow. Relations between the
executive and legislative branches often resemble a game of constitu-
tional brinkmanship. At the very brink, rather than resort to the courts,
both branches rely principally on the checks and balances established
two hundred years ago. Those structural mechanisms, however, do not
always suffice to resolve a modem controversy, which can linger on in
unwanted legislation, lawfully passed by Congress, but lastingly opposed
by the Executive.
I am particularly concerned that today's legislative process has ren-
dered the Presidential veto a less effective check on congressional en-
croachments than was envisioned two centuries ago. It is often very
difficult for the President to veto legislation that contains sometimes bla-
tantly unconstitutional provisions.
For example, Congress has become fond of inserting substantive provi-
sions in appropriations bills. This is what they call making a provision
"veto-proof." The President is put in the virtually impossible position of
having to veto an important appropriations bill that may allocate desper-
ately needed funds. It is no exaggeration to say that in these cases, Con-
gress often gives the President the distasteful option of approving an
unconstitutional provision buried in an appropriation or vetoing the
whole bill and shutting the entire government down. This has been par-
ticularly troublesome in recent years because of Congress' difficulty in
passing funding measures until the last minutes of a session.
The net result is that the President's veto, arguably the most powerful
weapon in his arsenal to preserve and protect his executive authority, is
rendered inoperative. This legislative finagling around the President's
veto also indirectly undermines our own liberties. Constitutionally, the
President is accountable to all the people-the chief reason the framers
made the executive unitary-but how can he account for himself fully to
the people when his power is so circumvented by Congress that he may
not veto provisions threatening his power or our liberties?
Congress is also increasingly attempting to micromanage the executive
branch on matters such as foreign affairs, routine executive branch oper-
ations, and even internal deliberations, that are solely within the province
of the Executive. For example, the President last year had to veto a joint
resolution that would have prohibited the export of certain technology
and services in connection with the codevelopment and coproduction of
[Vol. 68:485
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the FSX aircraft with Japan.6 This resolution contained a number of
constitutional wrongs. There was, however, one thread that united them:
each sought to hamstring the President's constitutional authority to ne-
gotiate with a foreign power.
First, the resolution would have infringed upon the President's consti-
tutional authority to define the scope and nature of negotiations with a
foreign state. In the conduct of negotiations with foreign governments, it
is imperative that the United States speak with one voice. Under article
II, that voice must be the President's. Nonetheless, Congress added in-
sult to infringement by language that would have required that the De-
fense Department consult the Commerce Department on negotiations,
and that the Secretary of Commerce make recommendations to the Pres-
ident. Congress, in effect, tried to force the President to renegotiate the
FSX by requiring him to heed what his own Secretary of Commerce said
to do about the deal.
After the surrender of the dictator Manuel Noriega to American
forces, the President's flexibility to act with dispatch to help our friends
in Panama was hampered and delayed by similar congressional caveats.
They were impetuously passed to stop any foreign aid, or military sup-
port, or tariff relief from ever going to General Noriega. Noriega was
incarcerated in a Miami jail, because of prompt executive action, but
these laws were still on the books, and blocked early help to Panama, in
some cases, for forty-five days.
Such provisions constitute clearly inappropriate intrusions by Con-
gress into executive branch management. But they also encroach on the
President's authority with respect to internal deliberations incident to the
exercise of executive power. The Constitution's vesting of executive
power in the President requires that the President exercise supervisory
authority and control over the internal deliberations of the executive
branch. Essentially, this means that the President must be free to struc-
ture the executive branch's decision-making processes as he sees fit.
However, the lengths to which Congress will sometimes go to intrude
on executive decision-making were never more evident than in this provi-
sion in last year's appropriation for Interior: "None of the funds available
under this title may be used to prepare reports on contacts between em-
ployees of the Department of Interior and Members and Committees of
6. S.J. Res. 113, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
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Congress and their staff."7 In other words, the Secretary of Interior
could not keep track of what his own employees may have said to con-
gressional staffers, let alone make report of such contacts that might
show up, for example, in a probe into undue influence by interested con-
gressmen on executive decisions.
Consequently, at one and the same time, Congress seeks to regulate
contacts between executive branch agencies (between Commerce and De-
fense, re: the FSX) while attempting to prohibit the executive branch
from regulating its contacts with the legislative branch (between Interior
and Congress, re: any matter). Such actions clearly erode the Presi-
dent's constitutional responsibility to supervise the affairs of the execu-
tive branch as he sees fit. While the Constitution gives Congress a free
hand in determining what laws the President will enforce, I do not be-
lieve that Congress has unfettered discretion in determining how the ex-
ecutive branch should execute those laws.
Let me speak from sad experience. Congressional efforts to prohibit
executive agencies from reorganizing or consolidating offices or to pro-
hibit agencies from expending funds on activities that are clearly a part of
the agency's mission constitute a particularly indefensible interference
with the day-to-day management of executive departments. Last year,
Congress inserted a provision in a Justice Department appropriations
bill, designed to prevent the FBI from changing the character of a field
office in Butte, Montana.' But the legislation escalated to sheer overkilll
The rider to the bill set forth that no funds could be spent "to relocate,
reorganize, or consolidate any office, agency, function, facility, station,
activity or any other entity falling under the jurisdiction of the Depart-
ment of Justice." To be sure, the status quo was maintained at the Butte
office for a few more months. But the language cited also delayed the
implementation of a recommendation to me from our U.S. Attorneys and
the head of the Criminal Division to enhance our effort against organized
crime by merging the separate strike force operations into the U.S. Attor-
neys' offices. It also prevented the creation of a much needed office of
International Affairs for our Department.9
Such provisions obviously represent petty politics at their most base.
Even worse, they prevent the American people from receiving the im-
provement in services they rightfully demand of their government. If we
7. H.R. 2788, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
8. H.R. 2991, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
9. Id.
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are going to ask Americans to give large portions of their paychecks to
Uncle Sam, the very least we can do is to provide them benefits and serv-
ices in the most cost-effective manner available.
Congress obviously justifies these and other restrictions on executive
branch actions on the ground that they are directly pursuant to the legis-
lative branch's appropriations powers. I have grave doubts, however,
that the power of the purse was ever intended to include the power to
define our foreign relations, to manage and structure the executive
branch decision-making process, to regulate contacts by agencies such as
OMB with other agencies, to prohibit the President from requiring that
he be notified when a subordinate communicates in his official capacity
with a member of Congress, and to require that Congress be notified of
all covert activities within forty-eight hours, even if doing so could
threaten American lives.
Yet Congress has attempted all of these usurpations, marking a trend
that ultimately poses a grave threat to separation of powers as a protec-
tion of our very liberties. If Congress can prevent me from restructuring
my own Department through its control of the purse, then Congress
could, at the extreme, conceivably prevent me from prosecuting the
friend of a member of Congress or even of a member himself-and that,
my friends, should give us all pause.
Yet another area of concern is Congress' growing penchant for dele-
gating executive power to persons not controlled by the President, an-
other trend that is particularly dangerous to individual liberties. The
President is elected by the citizens of all the states, and, to restate the
point, is accountable to them in a way no other elected official is. Indeed,
if the President fails to uphold the laws, if he acts unfaithfully, the Amer-
ican people can, and do, hold him responsible. Therefore, congressional
attempts to delegate elsewhere the executive branch's responsibility of
the President that is central to the successful operation of our constitu-
tional system for executing the laws undermines the direct accountabil-
ity. Not only does the President lose power, but the American people
may lose protections for their freedoms.
Let me illustrate by reference to the Office of the Independent Counsel,
an institution, I am well aware, given constitutional sanction by the
Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson. 10 Nonetheless, I suggest that the
office does raise legitimate concerns over separation of powers, particu-
10. 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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larly as the Independent Counsel's unfettered prosecutorial powers touch
upon individual liberties.
We are all aware of the compelling arguments for good government-
indeed, the felt need for some modem proscription against executive tyr-
anny-that helped create the Independent Counsel. But let me recall to
you another form of tyranny that can also arise unsuspected, and that
comes from the very choices a prosecutor must necessarily make in
bringing cases. Robert Jackson, as Franklin D. Roosevelt's Attorney
General, warned that this is where "the greatest danger of abuse of the
prosecuting power'jies," (a warning Justice Scalia repeated, at length and
almost verbatim, in his dissent in Morrison v. Olson).11 "If the prosecu-
tor is obligated to choose his case, it follows that he can choose his de-
fendants," Jackson warned. "Therein is the most dangerous power of the
prosecutor: that he will pick people he thinks he should get, rather than
cases that need to be prosecuted."12
An Attorney General must be acutely sensitive to this danger, so that,
as Jackson warned, the crime he prosecutes does not become that of "be-
ing attached to the wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious
to or in the way of the prosecutor himself.""3 If so, how much more
sensitive must an Independent Counsel be since the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act automatically focuses his or her prosecutorial actions upon
specific members of the executive branch? Indeed, do not the initiating
procedures under the Act all but pick the defendant for the Independent
Counsel?
I broach this subject briefly not to impugn any past or present In-
dependent Counsel, but to point out, forthrightly, present difficulties and
potential dangers that arise, even from the best of intentions, when the
separation of powers is ignored, or, as in this case, is legislatively "gotten
round." These dangers clearly derive from the parcelling out of execu-
tive power by the Congress, among the judiciary and the legislature itself,
to create an office such as the Independent Counsel. In the process, ac-
countability has been confused, the unitary executive further fragmented,
and the rights of individuals put in jeopardy by the built-in "targeting" of
prosecutive efforts not upon prospective offenses, but upon putative
offenders.
11. Address delivered at the second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, April 1,
1940, cited in Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 728.
13. Id.
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In isolation, many of the incidents I have cited today may not seem
overly threatening. But together they represent a trend that, if contin-
ued, could endanger our very system of government. That system has
relied on process to help ensure that individual liberties are preserved-
in the main, upon the separation of powers, writ large over two centuries
ago by the Constitution's framers to minimize the likelihood that individ-
ual liberties would be sacrificed to an increasingly powerful government.
As stated, today's overstepping by the legislative branch does not yet
threaten individual liberty. But it does unnecessarily challenge this Ad-
ministration's commitment to a less adversarial relationship between the
co-equal branches of government. And it is also compromising the gov-
ernment's ability to provide services with the care and dispatch our tax-
paying citizens expect.
As students of the law and history, we have long understood the im-
portance of separation of powers. We are now poised to share our na-
tional experience in developing institutions for implementing the rule of
law and defending human rights with those nations in Eastern Europe
awakening from their Soviet-imposed comatose state. Yet we can, by
right, only pass on what we can effectively defend and preserve here at
home. There is no better place to begin than by protecting and preserv-
ing the principle of separation of powers, so that it continues as a safe-
guard of our individual liberties, and an exemplar of democracy under
the rule of law, the world over.
1990]
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